Able Archer 83

Able Archer 83 adalah latihan pos komando Pakta Pertahanan Atlantik Utara (NATO) pada 2 November 1983^[1][2] yang mencakup seluruh Eropa Barat dan berpusat di Markas Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) di Casteau, sebelah utara kota Mons. Able Archer melakukan simulasi masa-masa eskalasi konflik yang berpuncak pada simulasi serangan nuklir DEFCON 1.^[3] Latihan militer ini juga memperkenalkan format komunikasi sandi yang baru, kesunyian radio, dan keikutsertaan sejumlah kepala pemerintahan.

Bentuk latihan 1983 yang realistis, ditambah hubungan memburuk antara Amerika Serikat dan Uni Soviet dan datangnya rudal nuklir Pershing II ke Eropa, membuat sejumlah anggota Politburo dan militer Soviet yakin bahwa Able Archer 83 adalah tipuan perang yang mengaburkan persiapan serangan pertama nuklir.^[3][4][5][6] Dengan kata lain, mereka khawatir bahwa apa yang NATO sebut sebagai "latihan perang yang dirancang mirip serangan" sebenarnya adalah serangan yang dirancang mirip latihan perang. Menanggapi latihan ini, Soviet menyiapkan pasukan nuklir mereka dan menempatkan pasukan udara di Jerman Timur dan Polandia dalam posisi siaga.^[7][8] Ini dikenal dengan sebutan kepanikan perang 1983.

Menurut berbagai sejarawan, kepanikan perang 1983 adalah salah satu masa yang menempatkan dunia di ambang perang nuklir setelah Krisis Rudal Kuba tahun 1962. Insiden yang lebih parah lagi adalah insiden roket Norwegia tahun 1995.^[9] Ancaman perang nuklir mereda seiring berakhirnya latihan ini pada tanggal 11 November.^[10][11][12]

Lihat pula

• Jam Kiamat
• Oleg Gordievsky
• Stanislav Petrov
• Rainer Rupp

Catatan

Catatan kaki

Bacaan lanjutan

• 1983: The Brink of Apocalypse – Channel 4, Januari 5, 2008
• Peter Scoblic, The U.S. versus Them. 2008

Referensi

• Andrew, Christopher and Gordievsky, Oleg (1992). KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. Harpercollins. ISBN 0-06-016605-3. Pemeliharaan CS1: Banyak nama: authors list (link)
• Andrew, Christopher and Gordievsky, Oleg, eds. (1993). Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985. Stanford UP. ISBN 0-8047-2228-5. Pemeliharaan CS1: Banyak nama: authors list (link) Pemeliharaan CS1: Teks tambahan: authors list (link)
• Cimbala, Stephen J. (2001). Russia and armed persuasion. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-0962-1. 
• Fischer, Benjamin B (1997). "A Cold War Conundrum". Center for the Study of Intelligence. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal Januari 9, 2008. Diakses tanggal Januari 8, 2008. 
• Fischer, Beth A (2000). The Reagan Reversal Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War. University of Missouri Press. ISBN 0-8262-1287-5. 
• Gates, Robert M (1996). From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 1-4165-4336-8. 
• Johnson, Richard William (1986). Shootdown: Flight 007 and the American Connection. Viking. ISBN 0-670-81209-9. 
• Oberdorfer, Don (1998). From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP. ISBN 0-8018-5922-0. 
• Powaski, Ronald E. (2003). Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981–1999. Oxford University Press US. ISBN 0-19-516098-3. 
• Pry, Peter Vincent (1999). War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0-275-96643-7. 
• Reagan, Ronald (1990). An American Life: The Autobiography. New York: Simon and Schuster. ISBN 0-671-69198-8. 
• Schmalz, Roman (2007). My Life in Stalin's Russia. Tate Publishing. ISBN 1-59886-570-6. 
• Testimony of Oleg Gordievsky to Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee of Military Research and Development, Hearing on Russian Threat Perceptions and Plans for U.S. Sabotage, 106th cong., 1st sess., 1999-10-26.
• Steven Rosefielde, Daniel Quinn Mills (2004). Masters of Illusions: American Leadership in the Media Age. Cambridge University Press. hlm. 253. ISBN 0-521-85744-9. 

Pranala luar

• "The Able Archer 83 Sourcebook" by Nate Jones at the National Security Archive
• Countdown to Declassification: Finding Answers to a 1983 War Scare by Nate Jones for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
• "The 1983 War Scare Soviet 'Huffing and Puffing?' 'Crying Wolf?' 'Rattling Pots and Pans?' or 'A Real Worry That We Could Come into Conflict through Miscalculation?'" by Nate Jones at the National Security Archive
• "'Blue's use of nuclear weapons did not stop Orange's aggression.' Able Archer 83 Declassified" by Nate Jones at the National Security Archive
• "'Rather Stunning Array of Indicators' of the Soviet Reaction to Able Archer 83 had 'A Dimension of Genuineness ... Often Not Reflected in Intelligence Issuances.'" by Nate Jones at the National Security Archive
• “One Misstep Could Trigger a Great War”: Operation RYAN, Able Archer 83, and the 1983 War Scare by Nate Jones
• "Operation RYAN, Able Archer 83, and Miscalculation: The War Scare of 1983" Diarsipkan 2008-11-22 di Wayback Machine. by Nate Jones.
• "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities" Diarsipkan 2011-05-22 di Wayback Machine., a declassified CIA publication from October 1984 that describes Soviet fears of a US attack.
• Did East German Spies Prevent A Nuclear War? Diarsipkan 2008-11-12 di Wayback Machine. by Vojtech Mastny.
• CNN Cold War – Spotlight: War games Diarsipkan 2008-12-19 di Wayback Machine.
• NATO First Strike Doctrine Diarsipkan 2008-10-12 di Wayback Machine. – The NATO nuclear policy at the time of Able Archer
• The Straight Dope: Operation Able Archer: Were the United States and the Soviet Union on the brink of nuclear war? Diarsipkan 2008-11-20 di Wayback Machine.
• "The Presidency in the Nuclear Age, Panel 3". C-SPAN. 12 October 2009. Diakses tanggal 28 March 2015. ; Panel discussion hosted by Caroline Kennedy with Kenneth Adelman, Thomas Graham Jr., Marvin Kalb, Richard Rhodes, and Nicholas Thompson
• CIA official page on the Able Archer exercise Diarsipkan 2009-01-14 di Wayback Machine.
• 1983: The most dangerous year by Andrew R. Garland, University of Nevada, Las Vegas